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Threats to modern nation states from organised crime and terrorism create 
environments in which intelligence becomes a vital component of policing and security 
plans but the increasing use of personal data for law enforcement purposes can alter 
the normative relationships between stakeholders and law enforcement agencies and 
between agencies and citizens. For that reason, police intelligence practice demands 
critical examination. This paper presents a narrative inquiry, based on the authors’ 
experiential knowledge and empirical research, into Europol’s Crime Analysis System 
(ECAS). The study explains Europol’s efforts to develop data collection and analysis 
systems that meet the needs of EU Member States. Through ECAS, it has created 
powerful tools intended to deliver intelligence products that help Member States identify, 
localise and neutralize transnational threats to a degree not witnessed before in Europe. 
Nevertheless, Europol’s performance in this context seems sub-optimal. Shortcomings 
largely are attributed to a lack of trust between Europol and Member States leading to 
failures to share information between themselves and with the institution. The result is 
that the latter’s strategic intelligence products sometimes are deficient or incomplete. 
That should be of concern to stakeholders because Europol’s strategic intelligence 
efforts may be rendered ineffective. Shortcomings in Europol’s intelligence products 
also are significant for citizens because they may mean that the information-sharing 
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This paper presents a case study of the development of the crime intelligence system of 
the European Police Office, Europol. In modernity, threats to nation states from 
organised crime and terrorism create environments in which policymakers turn more 
readily to information-based instruments of control. Traditionally, the collection, analysis, 
and evaluation of crime intelligence have been tasks undertaken by nation states’ law 
enforcement and security agencies. Today, the nature and scale of that threat have 
stimulated the creation of transnational criminal intelligence-sharing structures and 
processes. 
We use this case to critically assesses information sharing between law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs). Our analysis is founded on narrative inquiry and 
experiential knowledge. It also draws upon empirical research into police intelligence 
practice conducted by the second author (2016 and 2017) and by the second author 
and others (Author 2 et al, 2017). Increasingly, it is understood that information 
management is a vital component of policing and security plans. Intelligence has 
become a basic police tool for crime-fighting and for the maintenance of security (den 
Boer, 2002 and Tilley, 2016). That has significant implications for law enforcement 
agencies, their stakeholders and those under agencies’ protection. It is important in the 
context of the legality and effectiveness of state institutions’ intelligence practices, 
citizens’ freedoms and fundamental human rights because the former have the potential 
to threaten the latter to a greater extent than almost any other aspect of public policing.  
Europol’s crime analysis system (ECAS) may provide a useful template for the 
future development of international and transnational networked systems. Europol 
claims that such a system can allow LEAs to respond lawfully and effectively to the 
increasing dangerousness of the social world, to maintain their legitimacy and to 
demonstrate their commitment to the protection of citizens’ rights and fundamental 
freedoms (Europol, 2018). Yet, no matter how well they have been designed, these 
developments also signal the limits of structures and processes in this context. The 
paper argues that no intelligence system can function effectively without trust, which 
nurtures connections and nodes so that relationships between individuals and 
organisations are durable and productive.  
 Europol’s origins and structure 
Representing one of the first attempts to create an international policing organisation 
capable of countering transnational offending, Europol was established by Article K1 of 
the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union, signed 7 February 1992; entered 
into force 1 November 1993). In 1998, the Europol Convention was ratified and it 
entered into force in October of the same year. The institution officially began 
operations on 1 July 1999. Today, it represents the EU’s most comprehensive and 
formal node of crime intelligence practice in the fight against cross-border threats. 
Europol styles itself as a support centre for law enforcement operations, a hub for 
criminal information, and a centre for law enforcement expertise. About 20% of its staff 
are liaison officers seconded from Member States (MS) (Europol, 2018). 
Europol's mission is to support and strengthen actions taken by EU MS’ law 
enforcement agencies. It supports MS’ mutual cooperation to prevent and combat 
serious crime affecting two or more of their number. It also sustains activities to combat 
terrorism and other forms of crime affecting MS’ interests (as set out in EU policy). With 
more than 1,000 staff, Europol provides multilingual and multinational crime intelligence 
expertise from its headquarters in The Hague to LEAs across the EU and in its partner 
countries. It supports more than 40,000 complex transnational organised crime and 
terrorism cases every year (Europol, 2018). 
 
Europol’s powers and competences 
Europol does not have autonomous investigative capabilities and never directs 
operational activities (which always are solely the responsibility of EU MS). Europol’s 
representatives do not have the normative rights of crime intelligence services. For 
example; the lawful power to intercept telecommunications, covertly observe persons or 
places, or to manage informers are the preserve of the competent national authorities. 
However, Europol can make tangible contributions to law enforcement cooperation 
within the EU by: proposing common strategic frameworks (for example, the European 
Agenda on Security 2015-20); improving information exchange (for example, by 
managing databases such as the Schengen Information System); promoting operational 
cooperation; cooperating on specific operations; and by funding training, research and 
innovation in MS (Europol, 2018). 
Europol's crime intelligence competences have their basis in EU treaties and in 
international law. The institution’s forms and methods of analysis, interpretation and 
exchange of crime information are consistent with the already well-established practices 
of international policing. Europol undertakes intelligence-gathering activities but the 
application of coercive measures is the exclusive responsibility of the competent 
national authorities. Operational actions invariably are carried out according to the 
statutes and regulations, and - not least – the wishes, of the MS concerned (Europol, 
2018).  
 
Europol’s criminal intelligence process 
At the strategic level, Europol adds value to information provided by MS, to produce 
strategic diagnoses of risks associated with transnational threats via its: Serious and 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA); Internet Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (IOCTA); and EU Terrorism and Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). 
These strategic reports have been described as Europol’s ‘most important intelligence 
products’ (Ballaschk, 2015 p.37). At the tactical level, crime intelligence work carried out 
by Europol is supportive of and complementary to the intelligence functions of the MS; 
serving to increase the efficiency and functionality of the latter (Europol, 2018). Thus, at 
the operational level where the intensity, extent or nature of a threat challenges the 
ability of an MS to counteract it, Europol can lend its support; helping to collect, store, 
analyse and disseminate information between nations (Author 1, 2013). 
Europol’s primary responsibilities are to notify EU MS, via Europol National Units 
(ENUs), of information and connections between criminal offences concerning them and 
to coordinate, organise and implement investigative and operational actions to support 
and strengthen actions by the competent authorities of the MS, where appropriate. In 
liaison with Eurojust; Europol proposes and participates in joint investigation teams;  
providing information and analytical support to MS in connection with major international 
events; preparing threat assessments, strategic and operational analyses and general 
situation reports; and developing, sharing and promoting specialist knowledge of crime 
prevention methods, investigative procedures and technical and forensic methods. It 
provides advice to EU MS; operational, technical and financial support; and specialised 
training or assistance to MS in organising training in coordination with the European 
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). Moreover, it provides 
information and support to: EU crisis management structures and missions; centres of 
expertise for combating certain types of crime falling within Europol's objectives, which 
are facilitated, promoted or committed using the Internet; strategic analyses and threat 
assessments to assist in laying down strategic and operational priorities of the EU; and 
assists the efficient and effective use of EU resources for operational activities in MS. 
 
Europol’s Crime Analysis System (ECAS) 
Europol’s task in this context is the legal and effective systemization of its data 
collection, analysis and evaluation practices. The intended outputs of those endeavours 
are intelligence products that help MS in their prevention, diagnosis and detection of 
transnational threats. The system draws on information from open sources and a 
number of discrete databases. It is represented diagrammatically at Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Europol’s Crime Analysis System here 
 
The ECAS process 
As the figure shows, the process is executed according to the following phases: the 
identification of an organised crime group or terrorist organization through operational 
analysis; the location of the organised crime group or terrorist organization through the 
exchange of information between MS and Europol; neutralization of the organised crime 
group or terrorist organization (terrorists) by the MS (e.g. through arrests, detentions, 
disruption activity), with Europol’s analytical and other support; and the provision of 
feedback to MS via Europol’s systems and databases. 
In Europol’s combating of organised crime and terrorist threats at the strategic 
level, the following phases can be distinguished: first, the identification of criminal or 
terrorist phenomena as a result of its strategic analyses; second, location of the criminal 
or terrorist phenomena through the exchange of information between MS and Europol; 
third, neutralization of the criminal or terrorist phenomena through joint action by MS, 
international organizations and Europol (for example, through the development of 
programmes of international activities) (Author 1, 2013). 
The concepts of identifying, localizing and neutralizing transnational threats 
require explanation. These terms refer to the function of forensic science, which 
distinguishes the following functions: reconnoitring; detecting; preventing and proofing 
(Hanausek, 2005). Reconnoitring develops methods and measures calculated to obtain 
the greatest possible amount of information about the activities and plans of 
criminals/terrorists. It aims to bind the criminal/ terrorist acts with mechanisms that may 
bring about change. Detecting, aims to cement the operational knowledge obtained in 
the process of reconnoitring. Preventing, is taking action to neutralize the negative 
pressures and prevent abstract threats predicated on the basis of experience and 
research or analysis.  
Activities undertaken within the framework of proofing, include the forensic 
assessment of the probative value of evidence (Gruza et al, 2008). Thus, in combating 
transnational crime, reconnoitring and detecting routinely are associated with the 
identification of threat, while neutralization more usually features acts that amount to 
preventing or proofing. In both cases, ECAS seems – in principle - to provide an 
efficient and effective vehicle for the lawful and proportionate sharing of data (Author 1, 
2017). In practice the process of identification, localization and neutralization of 
transnational crime may include the following discrete activities: - 
1) Identification of problem by Europol; 
2) exchange of information within Europol; 
3) identification of criminal relationships with other countries; 
4) initiation of analysis in the form of an AWF; 
5) identification of further criminal relations with other countries; 
6) exchange of intelligence between interested MS; 
7) cooperation between MS' investigators through operational meetings; 
8) preparation of international operations (supported by Operational Center 24/7); 
9) direct analytical support (provision of mobile offices and experts); 
10) information exchange with Eurojust. 
 
Significant Europol databases 
Three databases probably have the greatest significance to Europol’s work: Europol’s 
Information System (IS); the European Bomb Data System (EBDS); and the Europol 
Analysis System (EAS) (Author 1, 2017). IS primarily is used to support investigations. 
The system collates and evaluates crime information collected by MS and submitted to 
Europol. It also is the repository for relevant data collected by Europol staff. Its functions 
include the abilities to search, visualize and link information. Linking of data allows for 
cross-checking so that information about the same objects (persons, means of transport 
or communication, addresses) can be grouped and classified. Common elements in 
putatively discrete cases are determined and information exchanged via Europol in a 
standardised manner.  
EBDS is a database of seized explosive devices. Data are collected in text and 
multimedia form (e.g. images and diagrams of electronic devices). The database 
provides European LEAs with information about explosive devices, pyrotechnic 
materials or their components. The EAS is an operationally-focused information system 
that hosts data contributed by Europol's stakeholders. The data collected is analysed 
using a wide range of tools. EAS is based on AWFs. These gather together operational 
and personal data, providing material for comprehensive operational analyses of 
criminal activities. AWF can be considered to have two dimensions; a technical tool that 
organises the analytical work and also a tactical entity that organises and focuses 
analytical and information-sharing activities.  
Examples of those work files are ‘Dolphin’ and ‘Islamic Terrorism’ (Europol.2018). 
Both explore the threat from terrorism at the tactical level. In both cases, Europol 
analyses specific features of terrorism, terrorist organizations and terrorists operating in 
MS. Intelligence can provide the impetus for the security services of the MS to initiate 
investigations or to implement police operations. Where MS choose to commission 
Europol, the latter provides them with operational expertise in the form of crime analysis 
and other specialist services. 
 
Asset recovery and financial investigation 
Europol has stated that an important element in combating criminal networks is 
understanding the financial aspect of their activities (Europol, 2018). Organised crime is 
big business, costing EU citizens tens of billions of Euros annually. The loss in tax 
revenues also has direct impacts on public finances and on public confidence in the 
ability of the EU and its MS to combat it (Bakowski, 2015). Europol’s published policies 
and plans aim to support EU MS actions against organised crime. Particularly, MS’ 
efforts to identify and localise the assets of those involved with organised crime or 
terrorist activity (Europol, 2018). 
The system of cooperation between national asset recovery offices is 
complemented by the work of the Camden Assets Recovery Interagency Network 
(CARIN). Supported by Europol (which acts as the secretariat for CARIN), it provides a 
framework for the exchange of information and experiences regarding the identification, 
freezing, seizure, and confiscation of funds related to criminal or terrorist activity. CARIN 
creates a system of national police contact points that are utilised to identify property 
and other assets located abroad (Author 1, 2010). 
In the context of counter-terrorism, Europol’s financial intelligence capability is 
supported by the agreement concluded between the USA and the EU (on 28 June 
2010) on the processing and transfer of financial data under the provisions of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP). This agreement allows for the lawful 
exchange of financial intelligence between the USA and the EU via Europol. In order to 
meet its obligations under the agreement, Europol maintains a specialized team of 
experienced IT experts and financial analysts (Europol, 2018). 
 
Assessing the success of ECAS 
The introduction of ECAS promised to give a new impetus to Europol’s efforts to combat 
transnational crime (Europol, 2018). In principle, underpinned by treaty and an 
institutional respect for national regulations and legal norms, ECAS can promote 
effectiveness, transparency and intelligence practice that respects human rights and 
citizens’ freedoms. However, it is axiomatic that any intelligence system is only as good 
as its inputs, and researchers have found evidence that the system is being undermined 
by MS’ reluctance to share information - particularly sensitive information - with each 
other and with Europol (den Boer, 2015; Bures, 2008). The second author of this paper 
consistently has found information-sharing between police organisations and their 
partners to be sub-optimal (Author 2, 2013, 2016, and 2017). Specifically, in the context 
of this analysis, Author 2 found that ENUs routinely sought from/shared information with 
their own liaison officers at Europol headquarters; few of those communications were 
recorded in the institution’s memory (Author 2, 2016). 
 
Shortcomings in the information management process 
Arguably, one of the most important measure of the effectiveness of Europol's crime 
intelligence model is the number and quality of information reports it attracts. Europol 
cannot carry out its operational work effectively without comprehensive and timely 
reports from MS. As was noted earlier, Europol's crime intelligence competences have 
their basis in EU treaties and in international law. Largely, those treaties and laws are 
permissive. That is, actions and behaviours are permitted, rather than prohibited, by 
those treaties or laws. In the context of this analysis, it follows that those treaties and 
laws allow for the lawful exchange of information between MS and between MS and the 
EU and its agencies but they cannot, and do not, compel or otherwise oblige MS to 
share. Too often in practice, information-sharing is sub-optimal (den Boer, 2015, UK 
HLEUC, 2008). That makes it nigh on impossible: to determine accurately the specific 
effects of the measures taken by Europol; to assess the real significance of Europol’s 
interventions; or to properly understand the extent to which the institution is able to meet 
the expectations of its stakeholders.  
This phenomenon is not unique to Europol; in the law enforcement milieu, it is 
both institutionally and culturally consistent (Berry et al, 1996). Author 1 (2013) has 
argued that too often in the European setting, attention to the lack of meaningful 
outcomes from an initiative or operation is deflected by institutionally-driven celebration 
of the process or the commitment to multi-national cooperation that the process 
engendered.  
James Sheptycki’s (2004) research provided significant evidence of policing 
organizations’ reluctance to share information; considerable organizational and 
technical obstacles to sharing information routinely were erected by the institutional 
actors he observed. Eric Lichtblau (cited in Brodeur and Dupont, 2008 p.25) highlighted 
that the withholding of information by police organisations was a process that ‘feeds on 
itself’. Agencies fail to share information with partners so as to protect their own 
knowledge interests; their claims that they are ignorant of partners’ needs simply is the 
means by which they justify inaction (Ibid.). Though, political imperatives cannot be 
ignored, it is argued that the focus routinely should be on outputs and not on process 
(Author 1, 2013). 
 
A question of trust 
Scholars have argued that trust; sometimes, more accurately, distrust is at the heart of 
the information-sharing dynamic (see for example Brodeur and Dupont, 2008). There is 
evidence of dysfunction in Europol’s relationships with MS; practitioners sometimes 
seem reluctant to share information - particularly when that sharing goes beyond their 
own operating environment (Author 1, 2017 and 2018; Author 2, 2017). Nick Tilley 
(2005 cited in Brodeur and Dupont, 2008 p.9) argued that trust provides a safeguard 
against the ‘malfeasance, mistakes and failures’ of members but too often that is in 
short supply. Arguably, lack of trust in Europol limits the institution’s ability to collect the 
information it feels it needs (Occhipinti, 2015; den Boer, 2015; HLEUC, 2008). While it is 
accepted that intelligence pictures invariably are partial and confused, one cannot 
reasonably expect Europol’s analysts to deliver comprehensive analyses in these 
circumstances. Without that ‘missing’ information, the value of their intelligence products 
is bound to be limited. Moreover, knowledge that might be corroborated by one or more 
of those direct communications may go uncorroborated and information held in ECAS 
that could be validated objectively may remain unconfirmed and its value undetermined.  
It is recognised that trust encourages the development of strong and enduring 
collaborations (Brodeur and Dupont, 2008). In their study of the UK intelligence milieu, 
Author 2 et al (2017) found little evidence of trust, or indeed strong and enduring 
collaboration between institutions. For example, even though research respondents said 
that they recognised the importance of engaging with partners and communities and of 
building trust with others, they acknowledged that officers needed more encouragement 
to build relationships and that more should be done to develop external relationships. 
One respondent said that intelligence ‘processes and protocols inhibited, rather than 
encouraged the free flow of information’ (Author 2 et al, 2017 p.86). Conversely, 
researchers have found that the value of trust in this context seems to be better 
appreciated by individuals who have proved adept at building their own, often cross-
cultural, communication networks and partnerships. For experienced practitioners (or at 
least those well-connected), national boundaries are no barrier to such exchanges 
(Author 1, 2013; den Boer, 2015).  
Enshrined in The Hague Programme (which introduced the concept of direct 
access to information), the principle of availability also may limit the information shared 
by MS with Europol. The principle is meant to support the rapid and timely transfer of 
information between MS. It allows LEAs lawfully to exchange ballistic data, fingerprint 
traces, DNA, vehicle registration information, telephone numbers, and the minimum 
required to identify an individual. This establishes the conditions necessary for the rapid 
and seamless exchange of information on those subjects between the competent 
authorities of the MS. In practice, it also gives MS the opportunity to bypass Europol. 
Therefore, the principle actually may limit Europol’s effectiveness because the 
information cannot be used by anyone other than those involved in the transaction.  
Arguably, in both cases (peer-to-peer sharing and in instances where the 
principle of availability is cited), knowledge is shared only with selected insiders and 
does not land in those central nexus points where it can be analysed and evaluated 
more formally for the benefit of the institution and its partners and it can be incorporated 
into institutional memory. Therefore, behaviour that seems to demonstrate increasing 
interactivity may perhaps be better understood as evidence of isolationism (Author 2 et 
al, 2017). That should be of significant concern to stakeholders - because Europol’s 
efforts in this context may be rendered ineffective – and to citizens because information-
sharing may be less transparent and therefore less accountable than it should be. 
 
Mapping cooperation in action  
The following scenario outlines how the ECAS system can work in principle. Though it 
should be noted that trust, of the kind assessed above, usually is more easily gained by 
actors in tactical or ad hoc situations like the one we will describe. In such situations, 
the aims of the exchanges of information and services can be agreed face-to-face; the 
products of those exchanges are more obvious and more tangible (in terms of arrests, 
seizures of contraband and criminal profits). Arguably, a commitment to reciprocity is a 
key factor in strong and enduring formal information-sharing arrangements (Author 2 et 
al, 2017). We argue that is more difficult to achieve at the institutional level. Putative 
partners may not demonstrably share the same aims, the benefits to each of the 
partners of any relationship established, may be less obvious or less quantifiable 
immediately, and – simply - it is harder to build trust via email or other online 
communication than it is through human interaction (Furumo and Pearson, 2006; Zheng 
et al, 2002).  
In this fictional case, the Spanish police receive information about the production of 
amphetamine in Poland. Information is passed to the Spanish liaison officer at Europol 
(through the Spanish ENU). She makes direct contact with her Polish counterpart who 
sends the information to the appropriate police department in Poland. Through simple 
operational actions at the drug factory (such as interviews and observations), the Polish 
police identify vehicles registered in Britain and in France. They update the Polish 
liaison officer who then discusses these initial findings with her Spanish, British and 
French counterparts.  
The British and French liaison officers report the movements of the vehicles to 
their own national services. The British officer finds that the British vehicles are of 
interest to its National Crime Agency (NCA). Intelligence suggests they are associated 
with an organized crime group specializing in drug smuggling. The liaison officer group 
discuss these findings then relay them to their own ENU with requests for further 
instructions. In the meantime, the Polish police make further investigations into the 
property, vehicles and persons. The material collected allows for the initiation of an 
operational control (information obtained as a result of it may be transferred to an AWF). 
Further working meetings are held in The Hague where information is exchanged, 
findings discussed and proposals for further action made.  
Europol liaison officers and analysts gather, analyse and disseminate information 
from the participating MS (in an AWF). Its analysts identify criminal relationships in other 
countries (revealed by personal contacts, telephone calls, bank transfers and so on). 
Europol hosts working meetings but acceptance or rejection of the analysts’ advice is 
the prerogative of the competent authorities of the MS. All investigative activities are 
conducted under the exclusive competence of the police and other LEAs of the MS 
concerned. Europol's final contribution to these activities is the coordination of the 
tactical phase of the investigation through its 24/7 operational centre, supporting the 
operation through mobile offices, expert on-site consultations and information exchange 
(Europol, 2018). 
In this scenario, we discussed the competence and the capability of Europol and 
of the LEAs in each of its MS. As we have shown, the legality of these activities is not in 
question but it is not law or treaties that ensure that these actions are carried through 
and investigations brought to successful conclusions. Those successes depend on 
structure - the framework that supports the investigation (the ECAS), agency – the 
motivation and capability of the people tasked with those undertakings – and critically, 
the extent to which individuals can see that the demands made upon them are balanced 
by the potential rewards. Researchers have found that trust seems to be much better 
appreciated by the kind of task-focused individuals we have described in our scenario, 
who have proved adept at building their own, often cross-cultural, communication 
networks and partnerships. For experienced practitioners (or at least the well-
connected), national boundaries seem to be no barrier to such partnerships (Author 1, 
2013; den Boer, 2015). Conversely, a priori, it is much more difficult for LEAs to achieve 
this level of trust at the institutional level. Certainly, few can bring forward evidence of 
their success in that regard; even if some have claimed it.  
 
Conclusion 
It is only natural that the perception of the social world as increasingly dangerous should 
stimulate the development of policing systems that attempt to harness information to 
deliver intelligence-led responses to crime. ECAS represents a lawful and ethical 
system for sharing criminal intelligence across borders. One that in principle, can act as 
a template for intelligence practice elsewhere. However, this study suggests that for all 
its merits, the system is neither operating as efficiently nor as effectively as it might.  
There are some grounds for believing that ECAS can deliver at the tactical or 
operational level where the necessary legal and organisational frameworks are in place 
and, normatively, a focus on the task and its shared benefits drives action. However, at 
the institutional level, shortcomings in the information-sharing process - where the same 
frameworks are in place but the focus on task and shared benefits seems lacking - 
undermine Europol’s efforts to manage risk, to identify, localise and neutralize 
transnational threats or to assign the right tools to transnational policing problems. That 
should come as no surprise. Few law enforcement agencies can claim meaningful 
success in that regard  
 There seems a need for greater reflection by policymakers and practitioners 
within Europol, MS and the wider law enforcement community on the processes of 
information-sharing. We wonder, even as the social world embraces virtual and 
asynchronous communication, whether institutions can find clues to strategic success in 
the tactics they employ at the operational level. Notwithstanding that, the search for 
answers may need to go far beyond classical ideas of policing, venturing into the fields 
of political science, psychology, and sociology where researchers have embraced new 
ways of thinking about networks and intra and inter-agency information transfer. We 
argue that finding those answers not only is in the interests of Europol, its stakeholders 
and its law enforcement partners in the name of efficiency and good governance but 
also in the cause of transparency and accountability to the communities it serves.  
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